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URING the past year the cases of greatest significance in the law of
evidence seem to fall under the general classification of hearsay. Each of
the cases selected for examination considers several exceptions to the hearsay
rule.
I. MEDICAL DIAGNOSES
Taylor v. Anderson' is the latest decision to apply the doctrine announced
in Loper v. Andrews,' concerning the admissibility in evidence of medical
opinion or diagnoses included in hospital records. A review of the Loper
doctrine and its development is in order before examining the particular facts
in Taylor.
In Loper the court held that medical opinion was admissible under the
Business Records Acte "only in those instances where it can be said that the
diagnosis records a condition resting in reasonable medical certainty."' In
solving the general problem of admissibility, the court created a specific
problem. Justice Pope, in his concurring opinion, pointed out the difficulties
presented to a court in deciding whether the diagnosis or other medical opinion
was conjectural." More specifically, the problem may be stated: Which party,
if either, has the burden of producing evidence or of persuading the judge of
the nature of the diagnosis?
Three possible solutions to this problem have been suggested (1) The
judge should take judicial notice of whether the diagnosis is controversial or
noncontroversial. (2) The offering party should be required to prove that the
diagnosis is noncontroversial before it is admitted. (3) The opposing party
should be required to prove that the diagnosis is controversial before it is
excluded. The third solution is the best approach, and it appears that it is be-
ing followed.'
* B.A., LL.B., University of Texas. Fulbright, Crooker and Jaworski Professor of Law,
University of Texas at Austin.
1474 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1971), error ref. n.r.e.
2 404 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. 1966).3 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3737e (1971).
4404 S.W.2d at 305.
'1d. at 306. The problem was also mentioned in three commentaries on Loper: Com-
ment, Opinion Entry Problems in Medical Records, 19 BAYLOR L. REV. 122 (1967); 20
Sw. L.J. 686 (1966); 44 TEXAS L. REv. 1627 (1966).
0See 44 TEXAS L. REv. 1627 (1966).
7The argument for adoption of the third solution is persuasive:
The opposing party would be less likely to object unless the diagnosis is a
critical factor in the case and unless he believes that the diagnosis is contro-
versial. The total expense of litigation would be substantially reduced, while
the jury, in its determination of the issues, would benefit from the additional
relevant evidence. The modern trend is toward admission of all recorded diag-
noses and allowance of the jury to consider the controversial nature, if any,
of these diagnoses in determining the weight of the evidence. Although Texas
has chosen a more conservative view, there is no strong reason to restrict
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In Weicher v. Insurance Co. of North America' the hospital record con-
tained the diagnosis of "heat exhaustion." Although the question was not
squarely before the court, it was indicated that the opponent of the evidence
would have "the task of showing that upon demonstrable medical facts the
... diagnosis was an opinion which would be the subject of genuine dispute
between doctors."' Language in the opinion in Otis Elevator Co. v. Wood"
reinforces this view. The medical opinion in question in Otis Elevator was
that at some time the patient had suffered a heart attack. The court stated:
"Since it is not disputed that the diagnosis recorded a condition that rested
in reasonable medical certainty, the policy behind Article 3737e . .. is satis-
fied."11 In Eubanks v. Winn the court rejected contentions that diagnoses or
expressions of medical opinion were not admissible because there was "nothing
in the record which might indicate that the business records show a condition
or diagnosis upon which competent doctors would likely disagree."'"
In one case the party offering evidence of three diagnoses adopted the
second alternative and proved that the diagnoses were noncontroversial."3
The diagnoses were of asthma, severe obesity, and diabetes mellitus. The first
two diagnoses were clearly admissible, the first because it was substantiated by
medical fact findings in the record, and the second since it was obvious to a
lay person. For the third, two doctors testified at the trial that the diagnosis
rested in reasonable medical certainty, and that reputable physicians would not
even argue over it.
In the recent case of Taylor v. Anderson"4 the third proposed alternative
seems to be adopted. The plaintiff claimed that she received a cervical sprain
in an automobile accident. Shortly after the accident she was examined at a
hospital, where the entry in the records was "unable to find anything on
physical examination." The court noted that when viewed in the context of
the case, the entry was a report that the physician found no evidence of a
cervical sprain. Recognizing that Loper required the courts to determine
whether the diagnosis was "non-controversial" and admissible, or "controver-
sial" and inadmissible, the court stated: "In the absence of expert testimony
on the question of whether a particular diagnosis rests in reasonable medical
certainty or not, a court must simply set about the task of determining, as best
it can, whether a diagnosis rests in reasonable medical certainty or whether
it rests primarily on 'expert opinion, conjecture and speculation.' ,s
The court then examined the diagnosis in detail, compared it with the
diagnosis in Loper, attempted to fit it within the three reasons for excluding
further the admissibility of recorded diagnoses by placing the burden of proof
on the offering party.
Id. at 1631.
8415 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1967), aff'd, 434 S.W;2d 104 (Tex.
1968).
1 Id. at 221.
10436 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. 1968).
11Id. at 330.
1'469 S.W.2d 292, 296 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1971), error ref. n.r.e.
3 Buchanan v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 446 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1969), error ref. n.r.e.




the diagnosis in Loper,"8 and finally held that the diagnosis was admissible.
The court concluded: "We find nothing in the record which would justify
our setting aside the determination of the trial judge on the theory that the
entry which he received in evidence shows a condition or diagnosis upon which
competent doctors would likely disagree. Stated more simply, appellants have
failed to establish that the trial court erred in allowing the hospital record to
be read to the jury."17
The court could have simplified its reasoning by adopting the basic holding
of Eubanks that the diagnosis will be admissible unless the opponent comes
forward with evidence to show that it is controversial because it is not based
on reasonable medical certainty. In other words, the rule of Loper should be
reformed to read: Diagnoses in medical records are admissible under the Busi-
ness Records Act unless it is shown that they are controversial or not based
on substantial medical certainty.
II. THE LONE WORKER
In Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Butler18 the problem of the lone
worker who suffers an injury while on the job and later dies was again con-
sidered. Butler was the operator of a dioxane plant for Dow Chemical Com-
pany. When he left home to go to work on the day in question, he was in
apparent good health. At about 5:00 p.m., however, he called his foreman
on the telephone and complained of illness. The foreman went to see Butler,
and later testified that his face "looked flush and pale and looked like he
just didn't feel good at that time."' " He took Butler to a clinic for treatment
and made an entry in his log book, a record kept in the course of his employ-
ment. The entry stated that "Butler got sick and went to Industrial Medicine
about 6:00 o'clock. He seemed to think E-Column OH vapors caused it.""
At the clinic and later at a hospital, Butler made similar statements concern-
ing the cause of his illness to treating personnel, and those statements were a
part of the hospital records. After Butler was taken to the clinic, another
employee inspected the dioxane plant where Butler had been working. He
did not find any leak, but later testified that there had been some gas odors
in the area.
The court held that the statements concerning causation in the hospital
record were admissible only to explain the experts' opinion of the cause of
death, and not as proof of the matters stated. However, the statements in the
foreman's log book were admitted on two bases. First, the log book was
authenticated as a business record, and the court held that Butler himself had
IcThe diagnosis was held inadmissible in Loper because: (1) the entry recited merely
that the physician believed there was a fracture; (2) the diagnosis did not purport to be
based upon demonstrable medical facts; and (3) the existence of a fracture was the sub-
ject of genuine dispute between doctors who examined the plaintiff.
17474 S.W.2d at 545, citing Eubanks v. Winn, 469 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.) 1971), error ref. n.r.e.
18483 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972), error ref. n.r.e,;
see Elliott, Evidence, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 135, 141 (1971), for a
more thorough discussion of the problem of the lone worker.




a business duty to report the information that the foreman entered in the log
book, so that the entire log book entry was admissible as proof of the matters
it contained."' Second, the court distinguished the cases of Hartford Accident
& Indemnity Co. v. Hale' and Truck Insurance Exchange v, Michling," and
held that there was sufficient independent proof of the occurrence of an excit-
ing event so that the statements made to the foreman were admissible under
the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. 4 The court recited the
following facts as independent evidence establishing the event:
Butler went to work in apparent good health. While admittedly on his
employer's premises and performing the duties of his job, he became ill. That
illness was evidenced not only by his statements as to his physical condition
• . . but also by testimony as to his physical appearance. The onset of his ill-
ness was sudden and dramatic. It continued with little remission until it pro-
duced his death. It is apparent that his death was caused by a sudden deteriora-
tion of the walls of his stomach. He had previously had injury and surgery to
his stomach but it had been comparatively trouble free for several years. The
very suddenness with which illness developed and progressed to produce his
death is indicative of the fact that it was brought on by some external agent.
.. Dioxane gas has the capacity to injure the stomach walls. The plant of
which he was operator processed dioxane gas. Though the worker who followed
him on the job testified that he found no gas leak, he did not exclude the possi-
bility of such leak in the overhead tower and said that the odor of gas was
present. A medical expert testified that the signs and symptoms shown in the
medical record were consistent with the intake of dioxane gas.'
The court surely reached a correct result, but it is suggested that a close
comparison of the evidence in the present case with that presented in the two
previous cases will show that they have not been distinguished. In reality,
the court has adopted the position of the dissent in Travelers Insurance Co. v.
Smith' that the startling event which triggers the exception to the hearsay
rule is the injury itself, and that there is clearly independent evidence of the
injury. It is certainly to the court's credit that it searched the record for evi-
dence which could be said to show independently that the startling event did
occur, but it would be preferable for the supreme court to retreat from the
harsh position which it announced in Hale and Michling, as suggested in this
forum two years ago."
21 The Texas Business Records Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3737e (1971), re-
quires that it be the regular course of business for an employee with personal knowledge
of the event to make a record or to transmit information to be included in the record. Here,
Butler had personal knowledge of the event and it was held to be in his regular course of
business to transmit the information to the foreman, who in the regular course of business
recorded it.
22400 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. 1966).
23364 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. 1963). These two cases held that in order for a hearsay state-
ment to be admitted under the excited utterance exception, there must be independent evi-
dence of the exciting event; that is, the statement itself could not establish the fact that the
event occurred.
24 The court used the term -es gestae, but the author converts that language to "excited
utterance" in the interest of clarity. See 1 C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, TEXAs LAW OF EVI-
DENCE § 911 (1956) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK & RAY).
25483 S.W.2d at 533-34.
26 448 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969), error ref. nr.e.




In Big Mack Trucking Co. v. Dickerson2 ' the plaintiff's spouse, Dickerson,
had been standing behind his truck when a fellow employee, Leday, parked
another truck behind Dickerson's truck and left it unattended. The second
truck rolled forward, pinning Dickerson between the two vehicles and killing
him. Workmen's compensation benefits were paid, but suit was brought against
Leday and the employer, Big Mack Trucking Company, under a provision of
the Workmen's Compensation Act which allows an action for damages against
the employer when he collects any part of the premium for the compensation
insurance from an employee."
The jury found that Leday was an employee of Big Mack; that he knew
the brakes on his truck were defective; that parking his truck behind Dicker-
son's was negligence and a proximate cause of the death; that his failure to
warn Dickerson was negligence and a proximate cause of the death; and that
Big Mack had withheld from Dickerson's wages premiums to be paid on the
compensation insurance. Judgment was rendered in favor of Dickerson's bene-
ficiaries against Leday and Big Mack for $220,000. Big Mack appealed on the
ground that there was no evidence to support the submission of any of the
issues, since the only testimony offered was inadmissible hearsay and therefore
incompetent.
The disputed evidence was contained in three out-of-court statements, two
of them by Leday and one by Stiles, vice president of Big Mack. Stiles' state-
ment was found in a deposition in which he stated that some of the premiums
had been withheld. It was held properly admitted as an admission of Big
Mack, since Stiles had been expressly authorized by the corporation to speak
for it."°
The first statement of Leday was found in a report to Stiles. Stiles testified
that after Leday returned to the office of Big Mack, he talked to him about
the accident. In this conversation Leday told Stiles that he had not been main-
taining the proper air pressure as needed to make the braking system work.
The court held that the statement was admissible, not as an admission by Big
Mack because adopted b} its officer, Stiles,"' but as a vicarious admission by
Big Mack through its agent Leday. Stated another way, since Leday was
authorized to report the facts concerning the accident to his superior in the
corporation, the report was within the scope of his employment, and thus
admissible as the admission of Big Mack.3
In the absence of adoption of the statement by the principal, the courts are
divided on the admissibility of statements made by an agent to his principal
as vicarious admissions of the principal.' The arguments for admissibility are
" 482 S.W.2d I (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston f1st Dist.) 1972), error granted.
TTEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12g (1967).
" See C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE S 267 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCoR-
MICK).
$'See id. § 269.
0' It is interesting to note that Leday's report to Stiles would not have been discoverable
under either rule 167 or rule 186a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
"s See McCORMICK S 267, at 642.
[Vol. 27
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persuasive," and whether the authorities cited for the proposition in the in-
stant case are really on point or not,' the decision is a good one.
The third statement consisted of the same or similar facts as those recited
by Leday to Stiles, and was made by Leday to an investigating officer. The
court stated: "It is not necessary to determine whether the statement made to
Officer Harwell was also admissible as res gestae."' Thus, the court avoided
an issue which has created much of the confusion in the Texas cases concerning
vicarious admissions.37 At least five variations of the fact situation of the instant
case might develop.
First, a witness to the accident testifies that he saw Leday standing nearby
when his truck started rolling. At the moment of impact Leday shouted, "My
God, I let the air pressure get too low." The witness could testify concerning
Leday's statement, since the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule
would surely apply."
Second, a newspaper reporter testifies that the public relations officer of
Big Mack told a press conference several days later that an investigation had
shown that the air pressure was too low. Again, the statement would be ad-
missible against the principal, since it was made within the scope of authority
of the officer making the statement. In this situation the statement did not
have to be made under the stress of excitement."
Third, the investigating officer testifies that some time after the accident,
when Leday was calm and unexcited, he stated that he had allowed the air
pressure to become too low. Leday has since met with an unfortunate accident
himself, and is unavailable as a witness. His statement to the officer would be
admissible as a declaration against interest, and could be considered by the
jury in a suit against Big Mack.'
Fourth, the officer testifies as in the third hypothetical fact situation, but
Leday is available to testify in a suit brought against him and Big Mack.
Leday's statement is certainly admissible against him as an admission of a
party opponent."' Since the liability of Big Mack is derivative, and the jury
would not be asked about Big Mack's negligence, there would be no occasion
for a limiting instruction. It would be strange to say that the employer could
be successful in a motion for instructed verdict on the grounds that the state-
ment, the only evidence of negligence, was inadmissible against Big Mack,
when no personal negligence of Big Mack is required. Big Mack is liable be-
cause Leday was negligent, and his own statement is certainly competent to
"See id. at 643.
5The court cited West Tex. Produce Co. v. Wilson, 120 Tex. 35, 34 S.W.2d 827
(1931); Argonaut Southwest Ins. Co. v. Morris, 420 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1967), error ref. n.r.e.; J. Weingarten, Inc. v. Reagan, 366 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Waco 1963).
31482 S.W.2d at 4.
37 See MCCORMICK § 288; MCCORMICK & RAY S5 911, 1164. See also Moore v. Drum-
met, 478 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972); McWilliams v.
Snap-Pac Corp., 476 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston fist Dist.] 1972), error ref.
n.r.e.; Garcia v. Sky Climber, Inc., 470 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1971), error ref. n.r.e., for other examples of the problems involved in vicarious admissions.
"See MCCORMICK 5 297; MCCORMICK & RAY 5 912-19.
3 9 See MCCORMICK 5 267; MCCORMICK & RAY 5 1164.40 See MCCORMICK §§ 276-80; MCCORMICK & RAY §§ 1001-11.
41See MCCORMICK 5 262; MCCORMICK & RAY § 1121.
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prove that fact. A contrary rule would lead to the peculiar result of a finding
of liability of an employee acting within the scope of his employment, but
an exoneration of his employer, who is supposed to be responsible in such a
situation.'
Fifth, the officer testifies as in the third hypothetical fact situation, Leday is
available, but Big Mack is sued alone. The statement would not be admissible
as an excited utterance, as a declaration against interest, or as an admission of
the driver as party opponent. The only theory of admission remaining is that
of a vicarious admission of Big Mack. The Texas rule has generally been stated
as: "The assertions of an agent are admissible against his principal when made
within the scope of the agent's express or implied authority to make asser-
tions."' Under this approach Leday's statement would be excluded, since it
is clear that he was not authorized to make this sort of assertion. However,
the trend is toward a broader admission of statements by agents." They should
be admitted when the statement concerns a matter within the scope of em-
ployment, and is made during the existence of the agency relationship.' "The
rejection of such post-accident statements coupled with the admission of the
employee's testimony on the stand is to prefer the weaker to the stronger evi-
dence. The agent is well informed about acts in the course of the business,
his statements offered against the employer are normally against the em-
ployer's interest, and while the employment continues, the employee is not
likely to make the statements unless they are true."' Leday's statement con-
cerning the air supply should be admissible in this situation, since the care of
the brake system was within the scope of his employment, and the statement
concerned that fact. It is suggested that a re-examination of the Texas position
on the matter is long overdue.
IV. IMPEACHMENT
In Loper v. Beto47 the United States Supreme Court has, in effect, adopted
the position of the dissent of Judge Onion in Simmons v. State," discussed in
the last edition of this Survey." The Court held that the Constitution forbids
the use of prior convictions, obtained in violation of the right to counsel, for
impeachment purposes.
41See Madron v. Thomson, 245 Ore. 513, 419 P.2d 611 (1966).
43MCCORMICK & RAY § 1164, at 57.
44 See MCCORMICK § 267, at 641.
41 See UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 63(9) (a); Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence,
rule 801(d) (2), 31 L. ED. 2D 88 (1973).
"MCCORMICK § 267, at 641.
41405 U.S. 473 (1972).
41456 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
4'Elliott, Evidence, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 26 Sw. L.J. 185 (1972).
[Vol. 27
